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Introduction
A close look at the sexual politics and social climate of Taiwan, especially
surrounding the LGBTQ community, reveals a strange and startling contradiction
between greater acceptance of all sexual expression in the public sphere since the end of
martial law in 1987 (Chen, Chiung-chi; Jiang; Wang) and increased regulation of
sexuality by the Taiwanese government (Ho, “Queer Existence” 538). Public
demonstrations have grown in number and the internet has allowed for the formation of a
more accepting social space for LGBTQ people (Lin 272). However, the expression of
their sexuality has actually become more restricted since the lifting of martial law due to
the political intervention of Christian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Ho,
“Queer Existence” 538). Laws passed at the behest of these groups with the stated
intention of child protection have adversely restricted the more accepting social space for
LGBTQ recently created in Taiwan by severely limiting their access to information and
communication on the internet, an important source of community (551). Therefore, an
apparent conflict has emerged between what seems to be a more accepting society,
evidenced by increasingly popular public demonstrations and the formation and growth
of a community, and greater regulation of that society. According to queer theorist Lee
Edelman’s theory of “reproductive futurism,” the rights and freedoms of actual living
LGBTQ people are subject to restriction based on the rights and wellbeing of future
generations which represent the continuation of society (Edelman 11). Therefore, by
examining the current societal and political state of the Taiwanese LGBTQ community
through the lens of Edelman’s theory, the previously described conflict can instead be
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seen as a dynamic tension. I argue that this tension, compounded by changing Taiwanese
ideas about LGBTQ identity and current demographic issues, can be explained through
the application of Lee Edelman’s theory of reproductive futurism, whereby society is
dependent upon reproduction to propagate itself and views protection of “the Child”1 as
its primary goal.2

Theoretical Framework
This paper will examine current conceptualizations of the LGBTQ community in
Taiwan and how they interact with other societal trends, namely the Taiwanese idea of a
homosexual identity, how that identity has come to be deployed and received in the
public sphere, the ways in which the government has implicitly and explicitly responded,
and current demographic issues. These will be studied through, as I see it, the lens of Lee
Edelman’s theory of reproductive futurism. His book often uses American or Western
examples. Therefore, it is important to separate, as much as is possible, his ideas and
theory from the specific examples he uses for evidence. Despite its American origin, I
believe his theory is not limited to countries falling under the “Western” or “American”
labels and is applicable to most societies, because although Edelman’s theory is drawn
from his experiences as a “Westerner,” children and their wellbeing are a common
concern across cultures. After researching Taiwan, I have come to see the many ways in
which his theory can be applied. Edelman’s theory of reproductive futurism seeks to
explain politics, and thereby public thought and opinion, in relation to society’s hope for
the future. According to this framework, all of society is based around what Lee Edelman
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terms “the Child.” This “Child” refers to the future generations of a country or society
and is the future inheritor of that society, with all its accompanying benefits and
drawbacks, and as such society believes it must always do its utmost to provide for its
future generations. These as-yet-unborn children thus become the impetus for every
political intervention as demonstrated by the constant pleas to provide a better future for
our offspring (3).
One of the main goals of reproductive futurism is to protect the future generations
of a society, an act often seen as extrapolitical (1), because there is no room to go against
these figural children (2). Doing so would make the opponents seem like evil child haters.
In order to offer such protection, society must champion innocence by safeguarding
against exposure to obscenities and inappropriateness, including what these future
children might discover about “dangerous ‘lifestyles’” via books or the internet (20). In
this way real freedoms are restricted based on the needs of an imaginary social figure, as
Edelman puts it:
That figural Child alone embodies the citizen as an ideal, entitled to claim
full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost
of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed. For the social order exists
to preserve for this universalized subject, this fantasmic Child, a notional
freedom more highly valued than actual freedom, which might, after all,
put at risk the Child to whom such a freedom falls due. (11)
Here Edelman describes a reason for part of the tension I argue for in this paper.
“Notional freedom,” or the rights and wellbeing of the future generations of society, is
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more highly valued than “actual freedom,” or those rights given to actual living members
of society. Any right given to those living members (in his discussion members of the
LGBTQ community) which may negatively impact the coming children of a society is
highly likely to be restricted.
The social order discussed in Edelman’s quote above is at the center of
reproductive futurism and its relationship to the LGBTQ3 community. Politics is used as
a means of constructing and maintaining a desirable social order (2), and in the
framework of reproductive futurism, anything which might prevent the next generation
from being born is a threat to the social order itself (11). Since LGBTQ relationships are,
for the most part, not based on reproduction, they and other queer relationships are
viewed as a threat to the continuation of society (9). Therefore, no matter how liberal or
radical the politics, if it works to maintain or better a social order, it is in actuality still
conservative because it serves to affirm that social order with the purpose of passing it on
to future generations of children (3). Ultimately, Edelman argues, any belief in the
intrinsic value of our lives depends on futurism (11). Queer relationships thus represent
the denial of that value, which is what results in the political intervention against them in
the name of protecting and providing for the future generations of a society. Edelman’s
theory will be applied in this paper when looking at explaining current trends in the
Taiwanese LGBTQ community and the country at large. It will particularly focus on
legislation passed by the Taiwanese government due to the intervention of Christian
NGOs and the backlash of Christian family protection groups against what seems to be
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the growing public expression and acceptance or at least tolerance of the LGBTQ
community in Taiwan, as well as on the recent demographic changes on the island.

LGBTQ and the Taiwanese Public
The Public Side of the Tension. In the past few decades, Taiwan has developed a socially
and politically visible LGBTQ community, marked by message boards, parades, and
mass demonstrations (Lin; “Taiwan's Gay Parade;” Wang). However, this increased
visibility has often been countered with government legislation and backlash from certain
segments of the population, such as Christian NGOs and other family protection groups
(Ho, “Queer Existence” 542). Though the growing visibility of sexuality in the public
sphere in the past few decades provided a more permissive social climate, Taiwan’s gay
community had already been in existence for some time.4 Gay bars were around in Taipei
in 1978. However, two such bars were raided by police that year in accordance with the
Police Law regarding preserving cultural morality and policing prostitutes. In the eyes of
the police (and by extension the government) at the time and in the early 1980’s, all
homosexual men were considered prostitutes whether they actually participated in the
trade or not (Hans 248). More gay restaurants and bars continued to be raided by police
on suspicion of prostitution into the mid 1980’s (249). Police raided gay saunas in 1998
and gay home parties in 2004, exposing and humiliating those there (Ho, “Queer
Existence” 540). I believe that by parading the participants out in front of the Taiwanese
media, the police and the media were complicit in the commodification5 of the mens’
bodies’ as not belonging to themselves but simply as material which would make
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shocking and attention-grabbing (and therefore ratings-earning) material. The bodies of
these gay men became nothing more than objects for the television audience to consume.
In 2003, the police raided and confiscated the materials at Taiwan’s only gay bookstore
(Ho, “Queer Existence” 540), founded in 1999 (Cohn) and sentenced its owner the
following year over the protestations of the gay community (Ho, “Queer Existence” 540).
The existence of such places in the first place shows how the social environment
of Taiwan was gradually becoming more permitting of such gathering spaces and how
the LGBTQ community was looking for ways to form such communal spaces. The
actions of the police seem to counter these statements, but such events can be seen as
typical in Taiwan, where the author Ni Jiazhen, a sex researcher in Taiwan, has pointed
out that in post-martial Taiwan the gay and lesbian movement is continuously marked by
opposing advances and retreats (Liu 520). This dynamic plays directly into the tension
between greater public expression of LGBTQ sexuality and the recent legislative
regulation of their sexuality that I discussed at the beginning of my paper. Although these
laws do not explicitly target LGBTQ people, in actuality they are the ones
disproportionately affected by them (Ho, “Queer Existence” 541). The gains made by the
Taiwanese LGBTQ community through the formation of social places such as bars and
bookstores and the harsh repercussions from the police can also be seen to follow this
pattern.
In recent years, Taiwan has begun to be seen as an example of tolerance and
acceptance of the LGBTQ community within Asia,6 a region where no countries have
legalized gay marriage. Taiwan is given this distinction, especially internationally, for
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several reasons, most notably its recent history of hosting large LGBTQ demonstrations.
Taiwan was the first country in the Chinese world to have a gay pride parade in 2003
(Cohn) with around 500 participants (“Taiwan's Gay Parade”), where the then-mayor of
Taipei and now president of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jiu, pledged his support for the gay
community. However, hundreds of marchers decided to wear masks to the event to avoid
being identified. According to Cohn, the Taiwanese interviewed for his article said this
desire for anonymity came from familial pressures. They explained that although
Taiwanese society in general is rather indifferent when it comes to homosexuality,
parents are no longer so accepting when it becomes a personal matter. It is viewed as
making them lose face in front of their community (Cohn). Thus although the general
idea of homosexuality is apparently not frightening to those concerned with the
continuation of their family line, I believe this attitude demonstrates how once
homosexuality directly poses a threat to reproduction, in this case of a specific family, it
begins to be seen as a problem.
However, attitudes about visibility have changed since the inaugural gay pride
parade. Since 2003, Taiwan has continued to host the event, which has become the
largest in Asia (Lai) and even extended to other cities outside Taipei. On October 25,
2014, Taipei held its twelfth annual pride parade, and this time it was with a focus on
inclusion of what the organizers called “the minority of the minority.” They wanted to
draw awareness to those who are bisexual, intersex, asexual, transgender, and queer, not
just what they saw as the publicly known gays and lesbians. In all, it attracted more than
50,000 people (“Taiwan's Gay Parade”). Far from the masks seen twelve years ago,

8

during and after the most recent parade Taiwanese were proudly displaying their
involvement in the demonstration. One college student made both his cover photo and
profile picture on Facebook a picture of him at the parade wrapped in a rainbow flag. The
open-shirt worn by him and the shirtlessness of the other man in the pictures is part of the
overall aesthetic of the parades, which often feature scantily clad men or men wearing
outlandish accessories (Chen, José). By actively participating in and perhaps even
initiating the commodification of their own bodies, I believe participants in the Pride
Parade have learned to take something which used to be deployed against them and are
now using it to their advantage, taking all the negative attention which was once given to
their bodies from both the media and the police in association with prostitution (Hans 248)
and using it to draw attention to something of their own choosing: their efforts to gain
equal rights in terms of marriage. Not long ago, houses were raided and gay men were
paraded in front of news cameras as examples of moral degradation (Ho, “Queer
Existence” 540). Now, however, it seems to me that certain marchers are reveling in that
same attention as it no longer comes with such a heavy stigma of prostitution. Rather than
fearing humiliation or retaliation like those exposed in the police raid on the home party
in 2004, the tens of thousands of Taiwanese who participated in the recent Gay Pride
parades (“Taiwan’s Gay Parade”) now seem to consider being part of the LGBTQ
community a part of their identity, demonstrated by their eagerness to make it known that
they participated in an event like the pride parade.
Taiwan’s LGBTQ community has not been limited to only pride parades when it
comes to demonstrating for equal rights, particularly the right to marriage. In 2011, about
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eighty lesbian couples participated in “Barbie and Barbie’s Wedding,” a mass, though not
legally binding, lesbian wedding ceremony where eighty couples dressed up, exchanged
rings, said “I do,” and received certificates saying they were “united in holy matrimony.”
It was held in the hopes of raising support for legalization of gay marriage on the island
(Wang). A year later in 2012, two lesbians were married in what Lai calls the first samesex “Buddhist” wedding in Taiwan (Lai).7 The Buddhist wedding was not the only mass
demonstration or publicly followed event in the Taiwanese LGBTQ community in recent
years. On September 7, 2013, more than 1,000 people celebrated at a mock gay wedding
banquet outside Taipei City Hall in support of legalization of gay marriage. Politicians
from the ruling Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party privately sponsored
the event and a Taiwanese pop star taped a message of congratulations and
encouragement to the couple being honored at the banquet (“1000 Join”). I believe that
the public support of prominent politicians and celebrities, as well as the sheer number of
demonstrations, indicates growing public acceptance of the Taiwanese LGBTQ
community. However, the response of some conservative family protection groups to the
wedding banquet demonstrates the attitudes of those reacting within the framework of
reproductive futurism and how those beliefs can be translated into public policy. A
coalition of family groups called a meeting with the media to express their continued
support of what the article calls “traditional family values,” and the group’s fear of the
dissolution of the Taiwanese family (“1000 Join”). Bearing in mind reproductive futurism,
the direct correlation of the legalization of same-sex marriage with the destruction of
family clearly demonstrates the group’s belief that queer relationships pose a threat to the
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future generations of Taiwan. The article also briefly mentioned a pastor who stated his
belief that the legalization of same-sex marriage would increase already high divorce
rates and cause low birth rates to drop even further (“1,000 Join”). I believe this is
another prime example of the prejudices of reproductive futurism at work. The people
demonstrating at the banquet were not discussing children at all, but an argument brought
against them was that if same-sex couples were given the right to marry, the Taiwanese
family and the birth of future generations needed to continue society would be threatened.
Despite the negative commentary, the government has offered some measures of
equality for members of the Taiwanese LGBTQ community. Several laws have been
passed which aim for the protection and equality of its members. The Ministry of
Education requires that tolerance of gays and lesbians should be part of textbooks and
openly gay and lesbian citizens can serve in the national army. Laws have also been
passed to combat discrimination in the workplace (Jacobs).
Members of the Taiwanese LGBTQ community have also found greater
opportunities for community and interaction through the internet. It has proved an
invaluable resource for information for those made marginal by contemporary Taiwanese
society (Ho, “Queer Existence” 541). Whether looking to explore their sexuality or
simply to find reassurance in the fact that they are no longer isolated, the internet has
given the Taiwanese LGBTQ community a place to do so (Lin 272). A specific instance
can be seen in an online community of queer males performing what author Dennis Lin
calls “sissinesses,” referring to “queered effeminacies” (271). In the late 1990’s and early
2000’s Taiwan’s local gay magazines were part of what the author terms “ever-growing
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sissyphobia and sissy lesbianphobia” (272) within the Taiwanese gay community. The
presence of the internet allowed those queer males who wished to perform sissinesses and
explore their sexuality a relatively anonymous and safe space in which to do so and a
place in which to actively resist the Taiwanese gay community’s masculine pressures
(273). Trans subjects in Taiwan have also found a measure of empowerment through the
internet by using it to make friendships and find information otherwise nearly impossible
to attain in a society which views them largely with suspicion (Ho, “Embodying Gender”
232). Both the growing number of public demonstrations detailed above and the
development of large online communities form the first part of the tension that I argue
surrounds the LGBTQ community in Taiwan. Such demonstrations are what give Taiwan
its international reputation as an accepting country. However, beneath this superficial
image the reality for Taiwanese LGBTQ is actually quite different.

Restrictive Legislation. As mentioned earlier, legislation regarding members of the
Taiwanese LGBTQ community has a tendency towards gains and backlashes. Although
they have been able to find empowerment and a sense of belonging through both the
internet and public demonstrations (Ho, “Embodying Gender” 232), recently enacted
laws have severely restricted what those social spaces might have become. Instead of
being able to use the resources offered on the internet without restriction and having full
uncensored access to the communities there, Taiwanese LGBTQ are facing what amounts
to censorship in the name of child protection. This is not the first time sexuality has been
regulated by the Taiwanese government. A law put into effect in 1953, entitled the Police
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Law, gave the police the duty of “redressing the customs” and “maintaining virtuous
customs,” which in large part amounted to the punishment of sexual misconduct and
regulation of the well-established sex work industry (Hans 238). In the 1970’s and 80’s
the police still acted as though most, if not all, homosexual men were involved in the sex
industry and punished them accordingly (248). A section of the anti-prostitution law
entitled “Law to Suppress Sexual Transaction Involving Children and Juveniles”
amended in 1999, quoted by Josephine Chuen-juei Ho, says
anyone found using electronic signals and Internet or other media to publish or
broadcast messages that seduce, broker, insinuate or by other means cause one to
be involved in sexual transactions is to be sentenced to a fixed-term imprisonment
of up to five years, which may carry an attendant fine of up to NT$1,000,000
dollars. (541)
Thus it does not matter whether or not any such electronic transaction actually happened;
posting it on the internet was cause for the police to prosecute the poster. Under this law,
between 2000 and 2008 more than 20,000 Taiwanese were indicted, although only a
quarter of the cases resulted in a conviction (Ho, “Queer Existence” 541). As the internet
is such an important resource for members of the LGBTQ community in Taiwan to find
information and make contact with others, this law has disproportionately affected them
(541). The Children and Juvenile’s Welfare Act of 2003, which included any person
eighteen or younger, instituted a new ratings system which censored, among other things,
sexually explicit published material (542). Literature was one of very few places in which
young Taiwanese LGBTQ were able to find representation, and suddenly it was now off
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limits (543). A new rating system for web content in 2005 encouraged self-labeling and
restricting anything which might not be suitable for children, which included any mention
of homosexuality, in order to avoid fines (543). In my mind, these restrictions play
exactly into what Edelman’s theory predicts about the restrictions of rights of real living
citizens in order to protect the figural future generations from harm, which in this case is
homosexuality. Actual living people were prosecuted and had their lives turned upside
down because legislators were concerned about what some child, somewhere, at some
unspecified point in time might come across on the internet.
It is not only individual gays and lesbians who have been disproportionately
affected by these new child protection laws. Josephine Ho, the director of The Center for
the Study of Sexualities at National Central University,8 was the subject of a formal
complaint filed in court in Taiwan by eleven Christian and conservative groups. The
groups claimed she was “spreading obscenity” by providing informational links on the
website for the Center’s database. Activism from marginal groups within Taiwan and an
international petition allowed her defense to be taken seriously and both the district and
high court found her not guilty (Ho, “Queer Existence” 542). By basing their argument
on claims of obscenity, the groups were attempting to force a prosecution through the
child protection laws regarding online content deemed harmful for children. Despite
being a purely informational link, once again the possibility that somewhere in Taiwan,
some child might stumble upon it was apparently so great and so dangerous that the
justice system was the only way to protect that imaginary child.
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Those child protection laws were the product of specific cultural policy making
efforts. Many of the Christian NGOs discussed earlier have been instrumental in the
formation of these laws and many are active parts of councils and hold great sway over
cultural policy-making in Taiwan. Many of the conservative Christian NGOs in Taiwan
began as charities after the lifting of martial law in 1987. Now they are present and
variably known as women’s groups, children’s groups, general citizen’s groups, and
charities (Ho, “Queer Existence” 544). The influence of these groups can in part be
attributed to the complex global power dynamics surrounding Taiwan. When both China
and Taiwan claim to be the legitimate government of China, other countries of the world
are forced to choose which to officially recognize. Since China has emerged as more
economically powerful in recent years, many countries have chosen to recognize it as the
official Chinese government (Yang 507). Thus Taiwan is eager to capitalize on any
connections which would create or strengthen international ties in order to approximate
legitimacy (Ho, “Queer Existence” 548). Although Christians accounted for only 4.6% of
the Taiwanese population in 2005 (Lo 179), their NGOs have been able to assert their
influence over legislation because of their international connections. Many are
internationally affiliated (Ho, “Queer Existence” 548), and some, like the Garden of
Hope Foundation, have won a number of prestigious international awards (“Milestones”).
These groups use their power to influence policies affecting the lives of LGBTQ people
across Taiwan, all in the name of child protection. The main focus of these NGOs
remains the protection of the women and children of Taiwan, especially young women in
the sex industry (“Background”). I can find no mention on their websites of official
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positions on Taiwanese LGBTQ issues. However, as Edelman stated would happen under
reproductive futurism, the laws backed by these NGOs demonstrate a willingness to
indirectly restrict the rights of LGBTQ in favor of the protection of future generations of
Taiwanese children.
Other groups are more outright in their stance against the expansion of rights for
the LGBTQ community. One such group, “Taiwan Defends the Household” (Taiwan
shouhu jiating) has a page on its website listing six reasons to oppose gay marriage (“6
Reasons”) and another citing studies which detail the possible effects of being raised in a
gay or lesbian household, such as a girl raised in a two-mother household being more
likely to be bisexual, engage in sexual activity with the same sex, use dangerous birth
control methods, have a baby out of wedlock, or an abortion. This is followed by a
comment that all this will “hurt society’s good customs” (“The Effect”). From examining
this website, I believe it becomes clear that reproductive futurism is at work. When
seeking to oppose same-sex marriage and expanded family rights, the group has chosen
to rely on the argument that to do so would be harmful to children. It apparently believes
this is the best way to appeal to the concerns of its readers and that demonstrating a threat
to future Taiwanese children will be the most effective way to convince others of the
dangers of equal rights for same-sex couples.9 Such groups are almost entirely Christian
groups, and though Christians accounted for only 4.6% of the Taiwanese population in
2005 (Lo 179), they have been able to affect major changes in public policy (Ho, “Queer
Existence” 548). Though perhaps not officially affiliated, the Christian NGOs and the
conservative family protection groups demonstrate the workings of reproductive futurism
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in different ways. When looking at the restrictions on the Taiwanese LGBTQ community
that I argue form second half of the current tension, the Christian NGOs and the
conservative family protection groups have taken both subtle and overt routes to denying
their rights, the NGOs as a result of policies they support and the family groups due to
Christian beliefs about family formation and its effect on children. The Christian NGOs
have worked to enact child protection laws which, although they do not specifically
mention homosexuality, severely limit the ways in which the Taiwanese LGBTQ
community is able to interact and access information through the internet and literature.
These laws demonstrate that the freedom of the figural child to go where he or she wants
and do what he or she pleases without having to worry about any possible negative
influence from exposure to unhealthy lifestyles takes precedence over the freedom of
actual members of society to communicate freely. The conservative Taiwanese family
protection groups are more overt in their reasoning for opposing equal rights for LGBTQ
people, saying that same-sex marriage and families will result in lower birth rates, girls
being more likely to have abortions, and even the end of the Taiwanese family itself.
Clearly, as Edelman predicted, members of the LGBTQ community are denied their
rights because they are viewed as a threat to the continuation of Taiwanese society.

Language and the Construction of Identity
By participating in public demonstrations and becoming such active members of
online societies, I believe members of the Taiwanese LGBTQ community are changing
the concept of what it means to be LGBTQ in a Chinese culture today. This definition or
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construction of identity is something which can be seen in the language used to talk about
homosexuality and queerness in Taiwan today (Lim 236). Before the early twentieth
century, there was no word in Chinese equivalent to the English term “homosexual.”
Instead, when talking about a man who engaged in a relationship or a sexual act with
another man, an author might have said it was something he “enjoys” rather than
something that man “is” (236). Author Katie King discusses the importance of language
and labels when she talks about how certain cultures or individuals resist the label of
“lesbian” because they believe it does not accurately describe their own local sexual
practices and identities (37). She also discusses how labels can be used to form specific
political formations (38). From these women’s resistance, I would argue that resistance to
a label is due to ideas about what that label says about one’s identity. From there it can be
further argued that labeling of a behavior or personality trait means it is incorporated into
identity. I believe that under previous Chinese thoughts about sexuality compared to what
King describes, identity is separated from action. One could not point at a man on the
street and declare “That man is gay.” Having sex and who one had it with was something
one did, not something one was. As long as a man’s actions did not prevent him from
continuing the Confucian patriarchal family order based on the Five Relationships10
(Archie) and the concept of filial piety11 (Zeng 15-16), his manhood and actions would
not be called into question (Brownell and Wasserstrom 32). Since identity was separate
from action, such actions did not necessarily preclude that man from also being married
and having children, since doing so would not be considered going against his identity.
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However, after the early twentieth century, a Westernization of the concept of
homosexuality took place, one which can be identified through an examination of the
language used to discuss it (Lim 236). During this time, homosexuality emerged as a new
and concrete social category, evidenced by the appearance of a specific word for
homosexual men and women. This word is a translation of the English word
“homosexual” (tongxinglian) and literally means “same-sex love” (236). This remains a
rather formal term for homosexuality and is taught in well-respected Mandarin textbooks
in Taiwan to this day (“Tongxinglian”). Once again, based on King’s work I argue that
having a label means such a label can be incorporated into a person’s identity, since a
label seems to convey a sense of permanency. According to King, a label seems to
assume a set of behaviors which are most often automatically ascribed to the person
being labeled, whether or not they actually all apply (37). This therefore removes the
distinction between identity and action. Thus, in the Chinese speaking world, with the
arrival of the word tongxinglian sexuality itself was no longer an action or set of actions
but a label and therefore identity which could be given and was consequently more
difficult to change.
Taiwanese are not simply relying on a Western concept for their LGBTQ identity
and identification. In the past twenty years, a new term has emerged: tongzhi, whose
characters literally mean “same will” or “same ideal,” (Lim 237) and which has specific
meaning for the Chinese speaking community both linguistically and historically (235).
First used to describe same-sex sexuality in 1989 by organizers of a gay and lesbian film
festival in Hong Kong, the term made its way to Taiwan in 1992 when Taiwan’s biggest
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movie awards, the Taipei Golden Horse festival, had a section featuring gay and lesbian
films. However, it is the historical context of the word which makes it more relevant to
the Taiwanese identity. The term was a translation of the Soviet Communist word
“comrade” and became popularly used in China following the words of Sun Yat-sen,
considered the father of the Chinese Republic (237), who said “The revolution has yet to
triumph; comrades must work hard” (quoted in Song 237). The term has since gained
popularity for many reasons, a few of which are its gender neutrality, the way it defies the
Western concept of homo-hetero dichotomy, and the native connotation and concept
already associated with the word (238). There is also the possibility that the adoption of a
word so widely used in China as an LGBTQ descriptor was meant to be a bit of a
political ribbing of China. The enthusiasm with which tongzhi has been embraced leads
me to believe that as a label it is causing sexuality to become even more entrenched in the
identity of many members of the Taiwanese LGBTQ community than ever before.
The equivalent of the English word “queer” is also one which has only recently
begun to enter the Taiwanese lexicon. In the early 1990’s in Taiwan it was simply
translated along with same-sex sexuality as tongzhi. However, other translations also
began to appear. One word, guaitai, which literally means “strange fetus,” was already in
use as a slang word for an eccentric person, so its use was partly an attempt to recreate
the double meaning of the English word “queer” (Lim 238). The translation most widely
used, however, is the word ku’er, whose pronunciation approximates that of the English
word. This is a translation which also contains specific linguistic meanings. The first
character of the word, ku, can mean extremely, cruel, or oppressive. It is also a slang
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loanword from English which is used to mean “cool,” as in interesting. Er means child or
son (235). Ku’er remains much less widely used than tongzhi (239). In the use of the
terms tongzhi and ku’er and their respective meanings and contexts, the Chinese speaking
community, of which Taiwan is a part, went from having no word for same-sex sexuality
to having a separate social category complete with multiple possible identifying terms.
Ideas cannot be conveyed without the language necessary to communicate them. In light
of King’s work, I believe that with the creation of labels for various forms of sexuality,
many Taiwanese now construct a sexual identity which was previously nonexistent in
their language and culture. With sexuality as an identity and no longer an action or set of
actions, there is much less room in society for a person to engage in both same-sex
relationships and heterosexual relationships, and therefore reproduction. Thus, in light of
reproductive futurism, these changing ideas about sexual identity have direct
repercussions on the probability of the birth of future generations. When Taiwanese take
up the label of tongzhi, guaitai, ku’er, or any other number of sexual identities, according
to King’s findings about why people do and do not accept certain labels of their sexuality,
the Taiwanese themselves seem to assume the set of actions believed to be consistent
with those labels. According to King, labels are accepted when the behaviors associated
with them are believed to match up with a person’s actions (37). Going against those
behaviors or actions would therefore be inconsistent with Taiwanese self-labeling as
tongzhi, guaitai, or ku’er. In Chinese, there are two ways to say “I am.” For ephemeral
states, those that are easily subject to change, no form of the verb “to be” is used. For
instance, if a Chinese speaker wanted to say “I am cold,” he or she would say “wo hen
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leng,” which literally is “I very cold.” However, for essential states, conditions or
qualities that are difficult or impossible to change, Chinese speakers use the verb shi. If
one was to say “I am Taiwanese,” it would be “wo shi Taiwan ren.” When declaring
themselves as tongzhi, Taiwanese do not consider it a passing state. One protest sign said
“wo shi jiao’ao tongzhi,” meaning “I am proud to be a tongzhi,” or “I am a proud tongzhi”
(Engbarth). Clearly, sexual orientation is considered an essential part of Taiwanese
LGBTQ identity. The stronger that sense of sexual identity, the further it takes members
of the Taiwanese LGBTQ community from continuing the Confucian family order.
Before the introduction of the term “homosexual” into the Chinese language,
there was no concept of a sexual identity in Chinese culture. The fact that a man had sex
with another man did not mean he was not also free to marry a woman and reproduce. In
modern Taiwanese society, once a man or woman has been labeled as gay or lesbian, the
chance of them defying the label and marrying someone of the opposite sex and
reproducing goes down dramatically. As labels become more numerous and more
specific to Taiwanese culture rather than simply being imported from the West, this could
lend a greater sense of urgency to the tension between greater public acceptance and
greater regulation in the name of child protection and reproduction.

The Demographic Dilemma
The self-construction of any of these non-heterosexual identities severely limits
Taiwanese LGBTQ when it comes to social resources regarding reproductive and family
rights like in-vitro fertilization and adoption (United States 12). When considering the
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demographic challenges currently facing Taiwan, the denial of these resources becomes
especially significant. As seen above, regulations affecting the LGBTQ community in
Taiwan and debates about their rights are often framed in the context of general sexual
regulation to protect children and juveniles. Laws were put in place to protect children
from accessing any possible obscenity and same-sex marriage was practically equated
with the crumbling of the foundation of society, the family. Such debates are always
rooted in concern for the reproduction of future generations of children. While the
welfare of children might be a common concern among members of society, most of the
push in Taiwan for regulation regarding their protection has come from a small minority.
They have been able to affect great changes in Taiwanese politics because their fears for
the future are not entirely unfounded. Looking at demographic trends in Taiwan over the
past forty years or so reveals how the reproduction necessary to maintain the growth and
wellbeing of the country is a very real cause for concern (Haub & Kaneda 16).
The demographic transition model used in this section was developed in 1929 by
an American demographer named Warren Thompson (Montgomery). Montgomery
provides a thorough yet concise explanation of the model, and the model remains widely
taught and accepted by many demographers based in the West as a basic way of helping
to explain why certain demographic trends have been seen throughout history, starting in
Europe and continuing all over the world since the Western Industrial Revolution, as well
as to predict how certain trends might play out in the future (Weeks 89-90; Thio 365;
Macionis 521; Giddens, Duneier, & Appelbaum 635). Since this model has so far proven
itself to apply to the majority of countries in the world and demographers have noticed
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aspects of it in Taiwan (Tsay & Chu 324), I have chosen to apply it to Taiwan’s own
recent demographic changes to illustrate the significant ways in which it has not followed
this model and what that means for the country.
Though some countries experience the rather gradual transitions described by the
demographic transition model,12 in Taiwan, demographic changes have come at a striking
pace. In 1970 in Taiwan, the total fertility rate was 3.9. By 2013 it had plummeted to 1.1
(Haub and Kaneda 16). Before 1950, Taiwan was mostly an agrarian society (Hans 242)
and agriculture was the biggest sector in its economy. As of 2011, agriculture counted for
less than two percent of the national GDP (Rigger 57). Taiwan is one of the top fifteen
trading countries in the world, and much of its economy is focused on human-capital
intensive information technology industry (41). These factors align with both models of
demographic transitions and what causes the changes in each of the stages. However, the
speed with which Taiwan has progressed through these changes is what makes their
demographic situation a cause for concern. Excluding Hong Kong since it is a city and
only has a population of 7.2 million people, Taiwan has the lowest fertility rate in the
entire world at 1.1. This means that the average woman is only having one child in her
life, well below the replacement rate of 2.1. Notably, this rapid drop in fertility rate
happened without any government intervention like the one-child policy implemented in
China to curb population growth and population momentum. In fact, by the mid-2050’s
Taiwan’s population is expected to shrink by ten percent from 23.5 million to 21 million
(Haub and Kaneda 16). By 2017, Taiwan will become an aged society, where more than
fourteen percent of the population is sixty-five or above and will become a super-aged

24

society, where that figure reaches twenty percent, by 2025 (Republic of China). Without
children to replenish and support this aging population, by 2045 there will only be 1.45
people supporting every elderly person in Taiwan, as opposed to the current seven
(Branigan). I would argue that any society based upon reproductive futurism would see
these statistics and be extremely concerned for its future. Children represent the
continuation of society and it is society’s responsibility to protect them, but if not enough
children are being born, the entire system is in danger. However, if a society is based on
reproductive futurism, the denial of rights to the LGBTQ community in the name of child
protection would also be present. This is exactly what has happened in Taiwan when
policies were put in place to address its demographic issues.
The Taiwanese government has enacted policies to encourage couples to have
children by implementing subsidies for healthcare for children under eighteen in the low
and middle-to-low income brackets. It also offers employees covered by health insurance
(both men and women) who decide to take unpaid parental leave sixty percent of their
normal salary for up to six months. (Republic of China). The Taipei city government in
particular has gone even further in an effort to encourage reproduction. They have created
a “birth allowance” of NT $2000, around $650 USD, available to every couple after
every birth. Notably, these children must come from registered households. Taipei also
provides subsidized health care for children under five, as well as tuition-free
kindergarten and after school care of kindergarten and elementary school children. The
city government offers a screening for Down syndrome and a “pre-pregnancy health
check after marriage” [italics added] (“Pregnancy Subsidy”). Despite this apparent desire
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for more babies to be born, fertility treatments remain unavailable for women who are not
married (United States 12). I believe that the restrictions placed on these resources are a
subtle example of the prejudices of reproductive futurism at work. The resources were
made available in order to promote the birth of children in families, which directly relates
to Edelman’s theory where concern for the existence and welfare of future generations is
most important to society but queer relationships are seen as a threat to those future
children. Therefore, despite the urgency of Taiwan’s demographic issues, these resources
are only available to married couples. Since same-sex couples are not legally allowed to
marry in Taiwan, they do not have access to these subsidies, parental leave, and other
benefits afforded to married new parents. Aside from denying them the right to have
children of their own, I believe the biggest issue for the LGBTQ community is the way
the government’s policies are promoting and normalizing heterosexual relationships. By
making birth resources only available to married couples and not permitting same-sex
couples to marry, the Taiwanese government is essentially broadcasting that it believes a
two-parent, heterosexual household to be the only one which it will support, the only one
it believes is fit to raise and provide for the future members of its society. Clearly, by
rejecting legislation which would have legalized same-sex marriage the government
revealed its belief that such a thing would not have been beneficial to society. If it was
under the impression that same-sex marriage would be good for its citizens, or at the very
least not detrimental, the bill would have passed. The denial of birth resources to samesex couples is just one more way the Taiwanese government is showing how it believes
queer relationships to be harmful to society. Outside of communication on the internet
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and representation within literature, the denial of reproductive rights of the Taiwanese
LGBTQ community demonstrates another aspect of the tensions between a more publicly
accepted community and continued restriction in the name of Taiwan’s future generations.

Conclusions
These diverse threads of public expression, sexual regulation, language and
identity, and demography can be woven together around the Taiwanese LGBTQ
community to form a picture of their current place in Taiwanese society. Looking at these
threads through the lens of Edelman’s theory of reproductive futurism is what brings this
picture into focus. In my mind, his theory most applies when queer relationships try to
obtain the same societal position as heterosexual relationships, and are therefore
threatening to the continuation and legitimacy of those heterosexual relationships. This
societal positioning can be seen in Taiwan in the push for the legalization of gay marriage
and the expansion of family and adoption rights for gay couples (Ho, “Queer Existence”
540). When looking at the idea of an LGBTQ identity in Taiwan, the repercussions of
reproductive futurism become clear. As previously discussed, in the past in Mainland
China same-sex acts could occur without necessitating a concrete sexual identity (Lim
236). Therefore, before the arrival of a “Western” idea of sexual identity, a same-sex
relationship perhaps did not necessarily preclude opposite-sex marriage and reproduction.
These same-sex acts thus would not oppose reproductive futurism. However, after
contact with England in the nineteenth century, a label emerged for those who
participated in same-sex sex acts, and recently new labels have emerged for members of
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the LGBTQ community in Taiwan, and with them new identities. With the attachment of
a label such as tongzhi, or homosexual, Taiwanese are concretely defining their sexuality.
By labeling their sexuality, Taiwanese LGBTQ are saying that the behaviors associated
with their chosen label match up with their actions. For many people, something
considered such an integral part of identity is not easily changed, and so once identities
not focused on reproduction became more common, they became a problem, leading to
many of these current issues.
The problems caused when one presents being LGBTQ as an integral part of
one’s identity can be seen in the great number of Taiwanese participants who wore masks
in their first Gay Pride Parade. The marchers said that even though Taiwanese do not
seem to care much about homosexuality, when it comes to someone parents know
personally such as their son or daughter they are not nearly as accepting because it makes
them lose face (Cohn). Thus, when homosexuality is not a personal issue, it is apparently
not a problem. However, once homosexuality enters one’s own family and consequently
threatens that family’s prospects at continuing due to the non-reproductive relationship, it
suddenly becomes undesirable, demonstrating a microcosm of a society based on
reproductive futurism’s problem with the LGBTQ community.
The greatest evidence of Edelman’s theory at work is in Taiwan’s legislative
activities. At the urging of conservative groups, Taiwan has passed restrictive laws that
are solely to protect its future generations. The concern for the morality and innocence of
those figural children is what motivated the new ratings systems, which were de facto
new censorship systems for youth with a very large spillover into the all-ages online
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community. If containing allusions to homosexuality is enough to make a comic book
unfit for minors, then that sends the message that all parts of the homosexual identity or
experience are unfit for children.
By framing homosexual relationships as harmful to or unfit for children, these
child protection laws are implicitly agreeing with the family protection groups in Taiwan,
notably the one mentioned above, “Taiwan Protects the Household.” This group
considers the effect and danger of being raised in a household by two same-sex parents so
great that it has its own webpage on their website. And that webpage is not an
afterthought, something only found after scouring the website; it is a key feature,
requiring only that the mouse hover over a link, which will bring down a menu with the
link to that page. Clearly, what is at issue here is not just gay marriage itself but what
such a thing would mean for the children of Taiwan, or more generally the future of
Taiwanese society as represented by its children. And apparently what would result
would “hurt society’s good customs” (“The Effect”)
When looking at Taiwanese demographics through the lens of reproductive
futurism, securing its future in the form of children is the focus of other preemptive
policies put in place by the Taiwanese government. Laws have already been enacted to
protect Taiwan’s future generations. However, if there are no children to protect then
society cannot continue to propagate itself and the entire social system is at risk of failing.
The Taiwanese government seems to believe that when the heterosexual population is
unable to sustain itself without any impediments, accepting the LGBTQ community and
granting them the right to marriage when their relationships are most often not based
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upon reproduction would just add one more obstacle to promoting the importance of
children and their necessity to society. Showing their concern about low birth rates
through all the policies put in place to promote childbirth while continuing to deny
fertility treatments to unmarried women (United States 12) illustrates that though the
Taiwanese government considers the low birth rate to be a cause for concern, the damage
a same-sex family might do to a child is regarded as a bigger danger. By denying samesex couples the right to marriage, the Taiwanese government is not only explicitly
discriminating against same-sex couples, it is also taking a stance against the LGBTQ
community in another way. Many forms of government aid, such as the pregnancy
subsidy (“Pregnancy Subsidy”) and fertility treatments (United States 12), are only
available to married couples. Thus no matter what the Taiwanese government might say
or do to the contrary, with these policies it is promoting the continued social
normalization of heterosexual relationships. Since women are not legally permitted to
marry women, they are barred from receiving this aid, which is moot in any case because
without fertility treatment (not available outside marriage) there is no possibility of
pregnancy. Notably, in other areas such as employment and education, discrimination
against LGBTQ has been made illegal and can be penalized (Jacobs). However, as
reproductive futurism would predict, in the section of the law which deals with children,
Taiwanese LGBTQ remain left out. The government wants to protect the future
generations by ensuring they are raised in a (to a Westerner) typical nuclear family, since
the multigenerational family previously common in Taiwanese society might no longer
be feasible. By only giving the benefits to married heterosexual couples, the Taiwanese
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government is essentially advertising what it believes to be the ideal family for raising the
future members of its society. Same-sex couples are apparently so undesirable as parents
to “the Child” that they are not only denied the right to marry but also almost every other
reproductive right and resource as well. Even with such a huge population issue hanging
over its head, Taiwan is still concentrating on preserving and encouraging as close as
possible to traditional family forms. The threat posed by same-sex parenthood apparently
looms larger than any population issues.
Though Taiwan superficially appears to be a rather accepting country of its
LGBTQ community, with huge parades, celebrity well-wishers, and an active online
community, beneath that surface are tensions negatively affecting every LGBTQ in
Taiwan. Laws aimed at protecting Taiwan’s future and figural generations are both
implicitly and explicitly excluding members of Taiwan’s LGBTQ community from full
equality, particularly in areas of communication such as the internet and reproductive and
family rights like marriage, government resources and subsidies, and fertility treatments.
Taiwan is certainly a leader in Asia when it comes to LGBTQ rights (Lai), and in many
ways life as an LGBTQ person in Taiwan has vastly improved in the past few decades.
However, the Taiwanese LGBTQ community still has a long way to go before its
members are able to recognize the full equality they deserve. That is why I believe the
first people who chose to say tongzhi could not have picked a more fitting word because,
in the words of Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the revolution in China against the Qing
Dynasty, “The revolution has yet to triumph; comrades must work hard” (quoted in Song
237).
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Notes
1. Understood to be anyone under the legal age of adulthood, in the case of Taiwan
anyone under twenty years old.
2. As many of the regulations which have affected the Taiwanese LGBTQ community are
framed in the context of child protection, I believe Edelman’s theory is especially
applicable in this case.
3. The “Q” in LGBTQ stands for “queer.” It is an umbrella term for all LGBTQ people.
This label is often viewed as a political statement as well as a declaration of sexual
orientation because it supports a break from binary thinking, saying that gender identity
and sexual orientation are not always set in stone. It is also sometimes used as a “simple
label to explain a complex set of sexual behaviors and desires” (“Definition of Terms”).
4. Most of the scholarship I was able to find, and most of the material used in this paper,
seems to focus much more on gay males in Taiwan than on lesbian females. Research in
the gender studies field that does focus on Taiwanese women tends to be concentrate on
sex trafficking and the sex work industry. I do not want to make uninformed speculations
as to the reason, but perhaps it could somehow be linked to what female-female
relationships represent (or oppose) in terms of reproduction. There is also the chance that
the reluctance to discuss female-female relationships or the way male-male relationships
seem to be better represented and studied could be influenced by other aspects of Chinese
and Taiwanese culture. It is a promising topic for future research.
5. The process by which anything, including people, is reduced from something having
intrinsic value to something which only has extrinsic value in terms of how much money
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can be made from it (Felluga). Therefore, a person whose body has been commodified is
only worth as much as the amount of money their body can make, whether it is through
advertisements or something like a news story.
6. A 2014 article in the New York Times was titled “For Asia's Gays, Taiwan Stands Out
as Beacon” (Jacobs).
7. I could find no mention of specific marriage customs in several books about Buddhism
in Taiwan, so I gather that the ceremony itself is not “traditional” or going against the
grain. This wedding does constitute a landmark event in a country with such strong
Buddhist influences and such a strong Buddhist presence. Taiwan has the world’s largest
Buddhist nun population, and six million Taiwanese, or about a quarter of the population,
identify as Buddhist. There are also many ways in which Buddhist practice has entered
and blended into Taiwanese folk religion (Rigger 106).
8. It is a member of the International Association for the Study of Sexuality, Culture, and
Society (“Center for the Study”) and advocates a sex-positive attitude and conducts sex
research (Ho, “Queer Existence” 542).
9. One of several websites linked to by “Taiwan Defends the Household” contains an
article which explicitly talks about “Taiwan’s population problem” (Taiwan renkou
wenti). It talks about how if all the babies aborted in Taiwan were still alive, there would
likely be no population problem. In the sort of roundup-like newsletter, it proclaims that
if parents continuously love their gay children, one day their children will “turn around”
(huizhuan), and once they have been saved, parents have to use love to forgive them
(“Safeguarding”). This demonstrates that being anything other than a heterosexual
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capable of continuing the family means one is in need of forgiveness. However, such
forgiveness can only be bestowed once the threat is gone and the possibility of
reproduction is a reality again.
10. According to Confucius, government and social order exist when people know their
social role and work to fulfil it (Confucius). People are also bound by a network of four
hierarchical relationships between ruler and ruled, father and son, husband and wife,
older brother and younger brother. They are also part of friend and friend relationships,
the only one of mutual societal position (Archie).
11. Filial piety means honoring parents and ancestors, treating them well, providing for
them, making a good name for the family, and a host of other responsibilities. A core
concept is providing male heirs to continue the family line and continue to honor and
worship the ancestors of a family (Zeng 15-16).
12. The following information (aside from a sentence cited as coming from work by
Griers and Ranier) comes entirely from a general model of demographic transition
explained by Keith Montgomery. The model itself is not his work but was developed in
1929 by an American demographer named Warren Thompson (Montgomery). In this
general model of demographic transition, countries pass through four stages characterized
by different demographic trends. In the first stage, birth and death rates are roughly equal,
leading to the slow growth of a low population. The second stage is characterized by a
population explosion where birth rates stay the same or increase slightly and fertility rates
(Montgomery), the total number of children the average woman will have in her lifetime
(“Fertility Rate”), remain stable but death rates plummet due to better sanitation and
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improvements in healthcare in general. Stage three shows a move towards greater
population stability as birth and fertility rates begin to decline along with death rates.
Montgomery explains that this change is caused by children being perceived as less
necessary to families. Before, when death rates were high and societies tended to be more
agrarian, parents needed to have as many children as possible to provide labor on farms
and to ensure that there would be someone to take care of them as they aged and became
too old to work. However, when infant mortality rates decline, there is no longer a need
to have so many children as there is a higher likelihood the ones that are born will survive
to adulthood. Urbanization also leads to lower birth and fertility rates since raising
children in urban areas is more expensive than in rural ones (Montgomery). It has been
proposed that the makeup and volume of a country’s international trade also has an effect
on fertility rates, that the more human capital (skilled labor) required in an economy and
the greater its reliance on technology-intensive industries (Gries and Rainer 1166), the
lower the fertility rates will go as parents decide that it makes more sense to have fewer
but better-educated children than to have many unskilled children (1167). However, in
stage three population still tends to increase due to population momentum. In the fourth
stage of demographic transition the population stabilizes and becomes older with the
fertility rate sometimes going below replacement levels, causing a swift decline in
population. Normally, these changes take quite some time to run their course, sometimes
taking almost 200 years to progress from the start of stage two to the start of stage four
(Montgomery). While it would be a mistake to take an overly simplistic viewpoint and
assume that all countries will exactly follow this model or that the demographic changes
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are entirely due to urbanization and not because of other factors, demographic transition
theory has shown itself to be flexible enough to more or less apply to many counties
outside of Europe as they experience their own industrialization. This model has shown
widespread application as evidenced by its widespread use today (Weeks 89-90; Thio 365;
Macionis 521; Giddens, Duneier, & Appelbaum 635) and remains a useful tool in
examining national demographic trends.
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